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It  is common knowledge that mobile individuals are difficult to tax. Governments 
accommodate these difficulties by granting special tax reductions to mobile individuals as it is 
expedient to get some tax revenue from these individuals rather than to lose them as tax 
payers completely. Taxing according to expediency is, however, criticized by ordinary tax 
payers who claim that the basic principles of tax equity are consequently violated. Therefore 
governments have to solve a difficult trade off between the two goals in order to survive. The 
variables entering in this optimization process remain disguised in the normal case of a 
representative democracy. In a direct democracy, however, the trade-off between tax 
expediency and tax equity principles is revealed by voters. 
In this paper we distinguish between situations where voters vote instrumentally in favour of 
tax expediency and where voters vote expressively in favour of equity principles.  
A popular vote in the canton of Zurich of 2009 serves as a natural experiment for testing the 
instrumental versus expressive voter hypotheses. We find that instrumental voting prevails in 
small rural municipalities and expressive voting in larger cities. As expressive voters are in 
majority in the canton, they exert a cross border externality by imposing their will on the 
majority decisions of the smaller municipalities. This observation may be of a particular 
importance when, on the federal level, expressive urban voters may impose their will on the 
voters of rural cantons voting instrumentally. 
JEL-Code: D720, H240, H710. 
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„Ita enim fieri solet,  
ut si uno loco nimis onerentur mercatores,  
alia sibi emporia quaesitum eant.“  
S. PUFENDORF (1672)  
 
Taxing Expats. 











1.  Taxing Expats Differently 
 
There is huge literature on the taxation of mobile factors. Most of it is related to 
the taxation of capital and capital income. The investigations are mostly normative 
and often related to the European Union where free movement of capital has 
been introduced with the single market in 1992. The question was and still is how 
governments should react on tax evasion in the single market in order to prevent 
mobile capital from escaping taxation (s. e.g. SINN, 2003, ch. 2).  
In this paper we ask how governments decide on personal income taxation when 
taxpayers are differentially mobile. The tax laws of the United Kingdom e.g. 
distinguish between resident taxpayers and taxpayers who have only a temporary 
status, often so-called “expats” coming from abroad and living for some time in 
the UK. Such persons may opt for and obtain a so-called resident “Non Dom" 
                                                           
*    Humboldt-University Berlin and University of Lucerne. 
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status and hence benefit from a regulation which dates back to the first British 
income tax law of 1799. Based thereupon wealthy subjects landed in the British 
Dominions were taxed on a "remittance basis" when they returned home. They 
had only to declare what they transferred home and what they earned at home 
but not on what they earned abroad. This old rule has been extended 
subsequently to all persons who have their family roots outside the UK. It survived 
in essence up to the present. The actual British legislation requires, in addition, 
that a lump-sum tax be paid, this tax increasing with the length of stay and hence 
decreasing mobility. It is planned that  “Non Doms” will have to pay 30,000 
£ annually for a stay beyond 7 years and 50,000 £ annually if they stay longer 
than 12 years.  
Similar taxes on “expats” are known in Belgium and in Austria. The United States 
Government, on the other hand, does not differentiate among forms of residence. 
It taxes U.S. citizens independently of their residence worldwide. The German 
government distinguishes between residents and non-residents, but not between 
different permanencies of residence. All residents are taxed on all their domestic 
and foreign revenues according to the residence principle. Non-residents are 
taxed according to the sources principle for revenues which are generated in 
Germany. 
Switzerland also applies the remittance principle as an option for non-working 
foreigners with residence in Switzerland, i.e. individuals who are presumably more 
mobile because they live from (worldwide) rents and capital income compared to 
those who live mostly from labour income earned in Switzerland and who are 
therefore less mobile.
1 But the authorities check whether the declared amount of 
rents and capital income is reasonable compared to taxpayer’s living standard.  
If the income declared is unreasonably low compared with taxpayer’s standard of 
living in Switzerland, tax authorities assess taxation on the latter. The assessed 
living standard or consumption then serves as a base on which the ordinary 
                                                           
1  Art.14 Direct  Federal  Tax Law (Bundessteuergesetz über die direkte Bundessteuer, DBG, SR 
642.11). Art. 6 Tax Harmonization Law (Steuerharmonisierungsgesetz, StHG, SR 642.14), Ordinance 
on  Lump-sum  Consumption Taxation (Verordnung über die Besteuerung nach dem Aufwand, SR 
642,123) of 1990.  The proposed new regulation of 2011 resticts lump-sum  consumption  tax to a 
minimal tax base of 400.000 CHF (Botschaft zum Bundesgesetzüber die Besteuerung nach dem 
Aufwand vom 30. Juni 2011). 4 
 
progressive income  tax schedules for local, state and federal income tax are 
applied under the presumption that the income earned abroad is taxed there (in 
the country of origin) and regarded as surrogate for possible tax obligations in 
Switzerland. If, however, the revenues from rents and capital located in 
Switzerland are larger than the assessed living expenses those become the 
relevant tax base.
2  This latter case is, however, rare for the typical foreign 
capitalist applying for residence in Switzerland has his wealth abroad. In practice 
most applicants fall into the intermediate class of the standard-of-living based 
taxation. A rule for the assessment of the tax base is actually five times the rental 
value of the residence to which the local governments add some increments 
practically up to the point where the taxpayer will consider leaving for another 
community in Switzerland or move to a foreign country.
3  In reality the living 
expenses are assessed in negotiations locally and endorsed by the cantonal 
government over a foreseeable amount of years. In this sense one can say that 
these individuals are subject to a “lump-sum consumption tax”. 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the motivation of expats to 
come to Switzerland and to opt for lump-sum consumption taxation. Section 3 
characterizes the tradeoffs that a Leviathan and a representative government face 
respectively when they decide between special taxation for expats and ordinary 
taxation according to equity criteria. In section 4 we focus on the choice between 
ordinary taxation and special expat taxation in a direct democracy. We shall 
develop the central hypothesis derived from the economic theory of voting and 
apply it to the recent vote on lump sum consumption taxation in the canton of 
Zurich. Voting recommendations are interpreted in section 5, and the econometric 
estimates follow in section 6. Conclusions are drawn in section 7. 
 
 
                                                           
2 With the effect that taxpayers have an incentive to keep their properties abroad. British Non Dom 
Residents, in contrast, can tax exempt their commercial investments in the UK. 
3 For a general legal interpretation see HÖHN and WALDBURGER (2009). Under the announced new 
Swiss legislation the relevant tax base is seven times the rental value. 
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2.  Why Do Expats Settle in Switzerland?  
Up to 1999 only 3000 non-working foreign residents of Switzerland have opted for 
lump-sum  consumption taxation in Switzerland. This number seems negligible 
compared to the total number of about 7 million inhabitants of which about one 
half pays direct taxes. But the number of lump-sum  taxed  individuals has 
increased to 5,000 until 2008 and is expected to increase still further mostly due 
to decreasing Swiss immigration regulations, to increasing taxation abroad, to 
unpredictable foreign regulations and to other political uncertainties. The majority 
of those who apply for lump-sum consumption taxation come from the UK, the 
Netherlands, Germany and France. The overall federal, state and local revenues 
from lump-sum consumption tax amount to about 580 million CHF (≈380 million 
Euro) or 0.1% of the GDP, almost 5% of the total tax bill in 2008. On the average 
a lump-sum taxed person paid taxes of about 116,000 CHF (≈75,000 Euros); the 
highest tax was 23,211 million CHF  (≈  15,100 million Euro) in 2008.
4  Hence 
despite of their preferential treatment these people pay taxes which are far above 
of what an average Swiss taxpayer pays. Therefore especially small 
municipalities are highly interested in attracting lump-sum taxed individuals.
5 
In a survey we have asked expats to enumerate their reasons for coming to 
Switzerland and opting for lump-sum consumption taxation. We have reached 126 
individuals of the upper tail of the 5,000 non-working foreign residents who opted 
for lump-sum consumption taxation and asked them for their motives to be rated 
from 1 to 6 for coming to Switzerland (figure 1).
6 The respondents gave 5 to 6 
points to the following factors: Security, quality of life, political stability, reliability of 
the authorities and taxes. Though taxes are named last of the top five factors, 
they are not of lesser importance. In fact, all five top factors are closely linked to 
each other. Where authorities are reliable and the political system is stable, tax 
obligations are reasonable and reliable and the quality of life is positively affected. 
Therefore all five factors have to be seen as a bundle. 
                                                           
4 Raw data from Finanzdirektorenkonferenz FDK (2009). 
5  Due to the fact that expats are high income earners and that the federal income tax is highly 
progressive, about three fifth of the tax revenue accrues to the federal government, two fifth to 
cantonal and local governments. 




Figure 1: Weights given to reasons of residence in Switzerland 
 
Source: Own compilation, see note 6. 
 
The justification to tax expats differently rests on the assumption that they are 
indeed more mobile than other taxpayers. A first indicator of a comparatively high 
mobility is that 70% of the respondents live for less than 7 years in Switzerland 
and 57% for less than 4 years. Another indicator is that 98% of the respondents 
own one or more residences abroad that they could use as a substitute residence 
if the tax rules deteriorate in Switzerland (figure 2). Finally we asked how many 
countries they could consider to live in if the lump-sum  consumption tax is 
abolished. 80% of the respondents have quoted at least one country, many 
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Figure 2: Real estate owned by the respondents outside of Switzerland in % 
 
Source: Own compilation, see note 6. 
 
3.  Revenue Maximizing versus Equitable Taxation 
A revenue maximizing Leviathan would tax all individuals down to their level of 
subsistence. As some of these individuals might escape taxation he would further 
on consider each individual’s mobility and first assign the highest tax rate to the 
most immobile individual and then, down the scale, tax each individual at 
gradually lower rates up to the last fully mobile individual who pays no tax. Such 
an individualized tax would, however, create excessive administration costs. As 
an alternative Leviathan would compromise and bundle tax payers in different tax 
classes until the administrative cost of an additional tax class equals the marginal 
benefits.
7 
In figure 3 five tax classes with standardized tax revenue are considered: In the 
first class are the most immobile individuals, presumably the real estate owners. 
Leviathan would tax away their full land rate. A little more mobile are wage 
earners in class two. They can migrate between jobs. But they may also have 
acquired specific local skills reducing their mobility. Therefore they will be taxed 
less than real estate owners, but still more than expats of class three who live 
                                                           
7 KEEN (2001) shows that tax maximizing competition between two countries generates similar results. 
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exclusively from capital. Non-working expats have no locational productivity 
advantages. They can earn the same gross income anywhere in the world. Only 
tax rates count for their locational decision including those amenities that are 
related to taxes as explained in section II. Therefore it makes sense that 
Leviathan would impose on such individuals a reduced tax such as the lump sum 
consumption tax. Next comes foreign financial capital deposited anonymously in a 
bank whose ownership may, however, be revealed upon request from foreign tax 
authorities according to the recently extended OECD rules. Insofar even financial 
capital cannot fully escape taxation. Most mobile are, presumably, people such as 
travelling showmen, opera singers, foreign administrative board members, 
speakers at conferences etc. who stay only for a few hours or days in a country. 
They are taxed least of all, often directly at the source to assure that the tax is 
paid. The city of Zurich, for example,  imposes a tax of 17% on the honorarium of 
a foreign opera star for a performance given one evening though his/her regular 
income taxation might require the top rate of  36.6% (for local, cantonal and 
federal income tax).  
Figure 3: The Law of Declining Imposition 
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Leviathan’s revenue maximizing taxation process according to mobility will, 
however, clash with the principles of equitable taxation e.g. by SCHANZ, HAIG and 
SIMONS requiring that all revenues accruing to an individual have to be added up 
independently of source and have to be subjected to the same individual rate.
8 
Constraining taxation to the principles of equity has obviously a cost to Leviathan. 
He will get less revenue for he can no longer differentiate between an individual’s 
revenues from land and from labour. Both have to be taxed at the same individual 
rate t in figure 3. The tax revenue shrinks from the total area under the step curve 
to the area in the hatched quadrangle on the left hand side of figure 3. All 
individuals  with higher mobility (on the right hand side) will escape uniform 
taxation t. So expats will leave the country and cause a loss of revenues in the 
size of the dotted area. Of course the uniform tax rate t could be reduced so far 
that all expats remain in the country. But this might reduce revenues from wage 
and property owners and hence total revenues. 
What should the government do? Should it pursue revenue maximizing tax 
differentiation of Leviathan or rather observe the principle of equitable taxation by 
SCHANZ, HAIG and SIMONS? Interest groups of labour and of land owners will push 
towards taxation according to equity principles, whereas groups who are 
interested in public spending will search to promote revenue maximizing tax 
differentiation in order to widen the budget constraint for higher expenditures. 
Ordinary taxpayers might also welcome special treatment of expats if the latters’ 
contribution sensibly reduces their own tax burden. All in all the government has 
to solve a difficult trade-off in order to survive in politics. 
 
4.  Theoretical Considerations on Voting 
This difficult trade off can, however, be resolved and revealed in a popular vote 
where voters express their preferences directly in the ballot box. To trigger a 
popular vote is particularly easy in the canton of Zurich. It requires only 6,000 
signatures or about 0.7% of the total electorate. In 2006 the social democratic 
party of the canton of Zurich succeeded to launch a popular initiative whose vote 
                                                           
8 SCHANZ (1896), HAIG (1921), SIMONS (1938). 10 
 
was held February 8, 2009. As we shall see later in this paper, the voters of the 
canton of Zurich approved the initiative, i.e. they repealed the lump-sum 
consumption tax. 
 
But what were the motives of the voters? The rational voter hypothesis (MUELLER, 
(2003, ch. 14) says that voters vote according to their expected benefits. They 
maximize their expected net return R resulting from the probability P that their 
vote is decisive and the expected benefits B of voter’s preferred alternative over 
the less preferred alternative and the costs of voting C. The resulting equation 





From an instrumental point of view, voters (who vote) have good reason to vote 
against  of the social democratic initiative. For an incremental expat generates 
above average tax revenue (see section 2). He reduces the tax burden of the 
other voters or he allows more utility generating public expenditures. From an 
expressive point of view things look differently. Voters merely want to express 
their sympathy with the initiators who are for equitable taxation a characteristic 
which is hardly seen as negative. But by voting expressively voters bear an 
opportunity cost. They give up the opportunity of voting instrumentally. Whether 
these costs are large or small may depend of the size of the local community. In a 
large community the budget pool is large and expats’ contribution to is not so 
sensible. In a small community an incremental expat to be attracted may 
contribute  considerably to the budget. Therefore we expect that voters will, in 
majority, vote instrumentally casting a no vote (against the initiative) in small 
communities and expressively a yes vote in a larger community.
10,11 
 
5.  Voting Recommendations 
At this point it is illustrative to look at the voting recommendations given by the 
initiative committee to the voters. The view that more tax revenues could be 
raised by subjecting expats to a separate tax was dismissed by the committee. 
They claimed that the financial contribution of the lump-sum consumption tax to 
the budget is not more than a „peanut“ of 6 million CHF to a total of 4,800 million 
                                                           
10 Under these circumstances, the fact that the vote is on a cantonal basis and all votes are counted in 
the aggregate does not affect voters’ decision on the individual level. The level of aggregation – local 
or cantonal – is a constitutional question and not a question of voting behavior. 
11 For a theoretical treatment of the expressive voter hypothesis see BRENNAN and LOMASKY (1993) as 
quoted above. Unfortunately the empirical literature on expressive voting is very scarce. However, an 
early experiment with donations vs. voting has been executed by CARTER and GUERETTE (1992) with 
little empirical support for the hypothesis. More successful was a similar experiment accomplished by 
TYRAN (2004). He finds no evidence for the low cost hypothesis as a determinant of voting decisions, 
but rather supposes that voters tend to approve a donation if they expect others to follow. FISCHER 
(1996) shows in an experiment that individuals vote more expressively the smaller the chance of being 
decisive. SOBEL and WAGNER (2003) find that the amount of U.S. state governments’ welfare payments 
is inversely related to the probability of a representative being the decisive voter. All in all experimental 
literature dominates. The only study on political voting  (that by SOBEL  and  WAGNER)  refers to 
parliamentary voting which is close to small group voting and therefore not comparable with our 
natural experiment.  
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CHF (2005) and that conversely a sensible revenue loss will not (yet) arise when 
the lump-sum  consumption tax is abolished and expats emigrate.
12  The 
supporters of the initiative suggested that the citizens of Zurich can afford to lose 
the expats and that there is scope for voting expressively in favour of horizontal 
equity in taxation. They conceded, however, somewhat paradoxically, that the 
revenues from the lump-sum  consumption tax might grow in the future and 
eventually become a relevant budgetary contribution. Therefore the decision to 
abolish the scheme should be taken rather now than later.
13 
14 Though the logic 
of this argument is questionable it was nevertheless important in the voting 
process in particular in small communities as it should help to pull as many votes 
as possible from the opponents’ to the supporters’ side of the initiative. 
In  addition the cantonal government raised its voice. A majority of them 
recommended the voters to vote no. This is not surprising as in their small 
committee every CHF counted. Every incremental CHF allowed them to spend 
more money. They explained their voters that the special expat taxation 
represents a locational advantage of the canton of Zurich vis-à-vis other cantons 
who would welcome the taxpayers expelled from Zurich in their own cantons. 
Hence government and parliament recommended the voters of the canton of 
Zurich to vote no. 
6.  Econometric estimates 
6.1.The Data 
Despite of government’s recommendation to repeal the popular initiative the vote 
was a disappointment for the government. On February 8, 2009 the electorate of 
the canton Zurich was called for a vote on continuing or abolishing lump sum 
consumption tax. A majority of 52.9% of the voters and 90 of the 171 
                                                           
12 This figure seems to be too low. Following our estimates, the state and local revenues of the canton 
of Zurich encompassed about 15 to 20 million CHF in 2005. Actually, in 2008, the Zurich lump-sum 
consumption tax brought a sum of 32 million CHF of which 13 mill CHF accrued to local communities, 
12 million CHF to the canton and about 7 million to the federal government. 
13 Source: Regierungsrat des Kantons Zürich, ed., Abstimmungszeitung des Kantons Zürich vom 08. 
Februar 2009.  
14 Another argument that land prices would rise due to immigrant expats was less convincing, as the 
400 Expats who immigrated  in 2008 were only 0.2% of the total of 108,000 net immigrants into 
Switzerland in 2008. 13 
 
municipalities voted in favour of the initiative. Hence from 2010 onwards the 201 
foreigners falling under the provision of the lump-sum  consumption  will either 




According to our hypothesis the voting results differed significantly between urban 
and rural municipalities. In figure 4 one can see that two areas are standing out in 
voting “Yes” for the initiative. The urban areas of Zurich city and Winterthur voted 
with over 60% for the abolition of the tax. These two city-municipalities account for 
about one third of the canton’s inhabitants. Furthermore the ten most populous 
communities (e.g. USTER, WETZIKON, DIETIKON) voted in favour of the initiative. On 
the other hand the inhabitants of the 79 municipalities in which a majority of voters 
voted against the abolition of lump-sum taxation  account  for about 25% of 
canton’s inhabitants, among which mainly the thinly populated communities. Even 
from eyeball-statistics one can conclude that community size may have had an 
effect on the voting result. Voters indeed seemed to vote instrumentally in small 
communities and expressively in large communities.  
 
 
                                                           
15 Source: Zurich Statistical Office, 2009. 
16The equity goal of the initiative to bring all individuals under the same tax law was obviously not 
achieved in the canton of Zurich. For actually 92 of the 201 foreigners taxed at lump-sum consumption 
tax in 2008 (about 50%) out-migrated presumably for tax reasons to other cantons or countries. 
Regarding those individuals, nothing has been achieved on equity grounds. They did not and do not 
pay the tax demanded by the majority of the voters, while all normal tax payers pay more and are on 
equity grounds neither better nor worse off than before. Therefore abolition of the lump-sum 
consumption taxation seems to be an inefficient means to achieve equity.  
Another question is whether tax revenues  will increase after the abolition of the  lump-sum 
consumption tax.  BRÜLHART  (2010, 2011) is optimistic. Considering data of 2010 of Zurich,  he 
concludes that public revenues might increase. These data are, however, not very reliable. It is one 
thing to calculate the tax loss from those who emigrated. But it is much more difficult, even impossible, 
to forecast how much taxes will be paid by those expats who remain in the canton of Zurich, as their 
foreign income and wealth will be taxed under the new regulation, while they were tax exempt under 
the old regulation. The more foreign income and wealth will be taxed under the new regime, the more 
outmigration will take place and vice versa. It is like chasing one’s own tail. 
A more pragmatic approach is to look at cantons’ revealed preferences. From a static point of view 
one can say: In as much as cantons adopted the lump-sum consumption tax voluntarily in the past and 
hence benefitted from it (revealed preferences), they will lose when this tax is involuntarily abolished in 
the future. Cantons experience a once and for all loss. However, if the expat population grows over 
time, the losses from abolishing the tax will increase from year to year.  
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Figure 4: Voting results in canton Zurich, share of “Yes” votes for the abolition of 
the lump-sum consumption tax 
                             
Source: MOSER, 2009. 
The 16 voting districts of the municipality of Zurich and the six voting districts of 
the municipality of Winterthur were aggregated to two single entities as both 
communities have only one budget each. With that we obtain 171 (instead of 185) 
municipal voting results and shares of municipal inhabitants. 
But to plausibly identify expressive voting through community size we had to 
control for additional possible municipal influences on the voting results. For that 
reason we collected data which cover the economic, socio-demographic and 
partisan (affiliation) characteristics of the 171 municipalities. As economic 
indicators we chose the fiscal capacity index and the municipal unemployment 
rate. The fiscal capacity index is computed as tax income per capita and is thus 
an indicator for the fiscal strength of the community. The socio-demographic 
influences are measured by a variable that contains the municipal share of the 
elderly (above 80). As a partisan variable we computed the voting results for the 
SVP (right wing conservative party) in the last cantonal election. The SVP was 






sum consumption  tax for foreign non-workers. Hence this variable covers 
symmetrically the political pros and cons in our econometric setting.  
 
With these variables we are able to control for expressive/instrumental voting 
apart from political preferences later on. All municipal control variables date from 
either 2007 or 2008 and were drawn from the statistical office of the canton 
Zurich. 
 
6.2.  Econometric Model 
In a first step we estimate a simple OLS model with municipal voting share of 
“Yes” votes as dependent variable and municipal variables (control variables and 
community size) as independent variables: 
i i in n i e Share Inhab b M b const Share Vote + + + = _ 2 1 _ ,            (2) 
where  Vote_Share  represents the voting result of community and i  and  M 
accounts for n different control variables in i different municipalities. Inhab_Share 
depicts the share of inhabitants to total cantonal residents of community i. The 
coefficients b1 (due to n control variables) and b2 capture the influence of the 
respective variables. In the basic model a constant variable const is included and 
e is the error term. 
In a second model we estimate the same OLS model but we are excluding the 
municipalities of Zurich and Winterthur to control for the possible effect of outliers 
and hidden heteroskedasticity. 
In a third model we estimate a robust weighted OLS model due to a 
heteroskedastic error term structure. In the setting of model one and two the error 
variance differed significantly due to municipal share of inhabitants: the greater 
the share of inhabitants the smaller the error variance. Furthermore, we tackle the 
effect of outliers without excluding the important city municipalities Zurich and 16 
 
Winterthur. Hence the estimated error terms from simple OLS estimation served 
as a weight in our modified model. 
6.3.  Results 
Table 1 shows the results of the three different above described model settings. In 
an additional fourth model we test for squared influences. As a control variable we 
chose the municipal financial capacity index (FCI) which is an indicator in the 
cantonal fiscal transfer system and represents thus a measure for the general 
fiscal strength of a community. Furthermore UNEMPL is the municipal 
unemployment rate, ELDERLY the share of residents above 80 years and 
VOTE_SVP the municipal result of the SVP party in the last cantonal election. 
In the first column the results of the basic OLS model, with all municipalities 
included, are displayed. As one can see, communities with more unemployed and 
a greater share of older residents voted in favour of the initiative and the abolition 
of the lump-sum taxation. Thus in our setting communities with a greater share of 
unemployed and older residents tended to more cheering/expressive voting. On 
the other hand the partisan (affiliation) variable VOTE_SVP showed the expected 
negative sign. Communities that voted in favour of the SVP in earlier elections 
were significantly less willing to vote in favour abolishing tax privileges (as 
described above, the SVP, was the single major party that argued against the 
abolition of the lump-sum taxation for  foreigners). Furthermore the financial 
capacity index (FCI) also had a significant negative sign. Hence citizens in 
wealthier communities tended to vote more in favour of a special tax treatment of 
non-working foreigners and thus voted instrumentally. They presumably expected 
a lower tax burden when wealthy foreigners immigrate into the community. Finally 
the share of municipal residents to total cantonal residents had a significant 
positive impact on the voting result. Thus our hypothesis seems to be 
corroborated that expressive voting prevails in larger communities as voters are 
confronted with a low cost decision there. As White’s Test for heteroskedasticity 
gives no indication of an influenced error term structure the result seems robust. 
It could be criticized that the large city-communities Zurich and Winterthur could 
distort the above observed effects. It must be remembered that the residents of 17 
 
these two cities amount to a third of all residents of the canton and that they voted 
strongly in favour of the initiative. Thus in the second column the results of the 
basic OLS model excluding Zurich and Winterthur are displayed. These results 
may be interpreted as control results for the general hypothesis. As one can see, 
the influence of the municipal control variables remains the same. The influence 
of INHAB_SHARE on the voting results is even stronger in the model excluding 
Winterthur and Zurich. The significance level is, however, still weak. But White’s 
Test now gives an indication for heteroskedasticity in the data. Consequently, our 
two outliers Zurich and Winterthur seem to conceal a general heteroskedastic 
error term structure in the first model. For that we have to adjust model one due to 
outliers and heteroskedasticity. We therefore apply a weighted OLS model to 
tackle the outlier problem and include robust standard errors to contain the 
heteroskedastic error term structure in the next step (third model). 
In the third column the results of the robust weighted OLS model are displayed. At 
this point one can see that INHAB_SHARE is now even more significant as 
compared to Model 1 and Model 2. Furthermore the reliability of the model – 
measured through R² − increases. The hypothesis that community size had an 
influence on the voting result is thus statistically proven and robust. 
In the fourth column we test, additionally, our weighted robust least squared 
model with squared inhab_share. The negative sign of inhab_share^2 implies a 
diminishing positive influence of the share of inhabitants on voting yes for the 
initiative. Our general hypothesis measured by inhab_share is now even stronger 
(1.7935**). The unemployment rate and the share of the elderly are no longer 
consistent. The overall soundness (or “reliability”) of the model increases. Hence, 
it is further proven that, in smaller communities, the rejection of the initiative is 








Table 1: Estimation Results 
 
 
P-values: *** p<0.01; ** 0.01<p<0.05; * 0.05<p<0.1 
Source: Own compilation.  
 
7.  Conclusions 
Expressive voting has become a challenging hypothesis since FIORINA’S seminal 
paper of 1976. But empirical tests have been regarded as difficult. In this paper 
we are able to measure expressive voting due to data of a natural experiment. In 
the case of lump-sum consumption taxation in the canton of Zurich, expressive 
voting turned out to be prevalent in large cities where lump-sum consumption tax 
adds little to the budget whereas instrumental voting is more frequent in small 
communities where the budget is sensibly improved by the special tax attracting 










FCI  -0.1509***  -0.1496***  -0.1514***       -0.1514*** 
UNEMPL  0.8842*  0.6853  0.9018*  0.6789 
ELDERLY  0.4650*  0.4297*  0.4643**  0.4031 
VOTE_SVP       -0.0821**       -0.0727*       -0.0824*       -0.0694* 
         
INHAB_SHARE  0.2876*  1.5862*  0.2375***  1.7935** 
INHAB_SHARE^2             -0.0592** 
const  67.9555***  67.3672***  68.0288*** 
 
67.46008*** 
         
R²  0.2426  0.2324  0.2800  0.3554 19 
 
Voting in small versus large communities on lump sum consumption taxation has, 
however, to be distinguished from the outcome of the cantonal vote as a whole. 
Eventually the majority of all votes in the canton is decisive. As expressive voters 
in the large cities represent in a vast majority in the canton, it was easy for them 
to crowd out opposing majority decisions in small communities. Insofar the urban 
majorities exerted a cross-border externality on majorities of small communities. 
How far such cross border  externalities are to be tolerated is a constitutional 
question to be discussed in the coming federal debate on the future of lump-sum 
consumption taxation. 
At first sight, expressive voters seem to be the great winners of the vote in the 
canton of Zurich as well as possibly even on the federal level. They succeeded to 
secure that all inhabitants are taxed according to the same principles. But 
expressive voters’ satisfaction may turn out to be short sighted as those who 
should pay the higher tax will emigrate and hence not pay their due share. 
Looking at inhabitants ex post, tax equity has (seemingly) improved. Considering 
inhabitants ex ante, however, tax equity has not changed by the vote. Tax equity 
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